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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The ultimate determination whether the accident arose out 
of or in the course of employment, presents the following 
issues: 
1. Is there a close association between the IPP Plant and 
the Brush-Wellman Road? 
2. Was there heavy traffic and can heavy traffic be 
considered a special hazard? 
3. Did the alleged special hazard cause the accident? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1984) determines the outcome of 
this case. The relevant portion states: 
Every employee . . . who is injured . . . by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment . . . shall be paid compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings And Disposi-
tion By The Industrial Commission. 
This case arises under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. 
William Michael Posso ("Posso") filed an application for 
hearing on October 22, 1984, against Cherne Construction for an 
accident occurring near the Intermountain Power Project Plant 
("IPP"). (R. 2) An evidentiary hearing was held on 
January 25, 1985. (R. 24) The sole issue at the hearing was 
whether the accident arose out of or in the course of employ-
ment. (R. 25) 
On September 12, 1985, Administrative Law Judge Janet L. 
Moffitt entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Interim Order. She found that the "special hazards" exception 
to the "going and coming" rule brought the accident within the 
scope of employment. (R. 119-124) On September 26, 1985, 
Cherne Construction Company filed its Motion for Review. 
(R. 127, 128) With Chairman Stephen M. Hadley dissenting, the 
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Industrial Commission denied the Motion on January 16, 1986, 
(R. 154-157) 
B. Statement Of The Facts. 
Although not regularly scheduled to work on Saturday 
August 4, 1984, Posso came to work at the IPP Plant that day to 
move office furniture from a building to a trailer. (R. 27) 
When he completed the work, he checked out at the security gate 
and proceeded to the employee parking lot where he boarded his 
motorcycle. (R. 29) He then left the IPP Plant and headed 
east on the Brush-Wellman Road to return to his residence in 
Delta, Utah. (R. 27, 30, 47) When he left the plant, his work 
was completed. (R. 47, 48) 
The Brush-Wellman Road is a public highway maintained by 
Millard County. (R. 66, 67) The IPP Plant is on this road 
approximately 7 miles west of its intersection with State 
Highway 6. (R. 82) The Brush-Wellman Road extends many miles 
West to the Utah-Nevada border. (R. 64) Also located on this 
road are a Beryllium Plant (east of the IPP Plant) and gravel 
pits, sheep camps, grazing areas, mining sites and hiking areas 
(west of the IPP Plant). (R. 63-65) The road existed years 
before the IPP Plant was established. (R. 43) After the IPP 
Plant opened, the shoulders of the road were paved. The north 
paved shoulder is used for turning right into the plant or for 
turning right on leaving the plant. The south paved shoulder 
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is used for through traffic so that the regular lane can be 
used for eastbound traffic to turn left into the plant and left 
on leaving the plant. (R. 45) 
When Posso headed east on the Brush-Wellman Road, he 
intended to go about 7 miles to its intersection with State 
Highway 6 and then south on State Highway 6 to Delta. (R. 3, 
33, 82) He could have used either of two other roads to reach 
Delta more directly. (R. 69, 70) 
When Posso began traveling east on the Brush-Wellman Road, 
he observed two other vehicles, both of which were traveling 
eastbound. A Blazer was on the paved shoulder to Posso*s right 
and a Plymouth was more than 150 yards ahead of him. (R. 31, 
32) Apparently, no traffic was coming westbound since Posso 
crossed into the westbound lane to pass the Plymouth. (R. 32) 
Posso observed the Plymouth slow down without seeing any 
brake lights or turn signals. It almost came to a stop about 
150 yards in front of him. (R. 32) Rather than slow down 
himself, Posso turned his motorcycle into the oncoming lane of 
traffic. (R. 32) As he reached the Plymouth, it turned left 
resulting in a collision. (R. 32) It appeared that the 
Plymouth was turning to the IPP Man Camp. (R. 32) It was not 
known whether the driver of the Plymouth worked at the IPP 
Plant. (R. 78) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The controversy centers on the special hazards exception 
recently discussed by this Coart in Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. 
Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985). 
The first requirement for allowing the special hazards 
exception is a close association of the Brush-Wellman road with 
the IPP Plant. Usually this means it must have been the only 
route. Posso had three routes to work. Obviously it was not 
the only route. The Commission's use of a normal route 
standard obliterates the rule that travel to and from work is 
not in the course or scope of employment. Additionally, the 
necessary identification of the route with the work place does 
not exis:. 
The second requirement is that a special hazard exist. The 
Commission first concluded that there was heavy traffic. 
However, the evidence contradicts this. And even if there was 
heavy traffic, there was no showing that it was dangerous. 
The last requirement is that the alleged special hazard 
cause the accident. Since there were only three cars on the 
road (including Posso1s) when the accident occurred, heavy 
traffic could not have caused the accident. 
Posso fails to meet the requirements of the special hazard 
test. 
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ARGUMENT 
The parties agree that Posso had ended his work, left the 
employer's premises and was traveling home on a public road 
when the accident occurred. They also agree that for the 
accident to be within the scope of employment, the special 
hazards exception must apply. (R. 97, 106, 121, 154) This 
exception was most recently reviewed by this Court in Soldier 
Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985). (This 
decision was announced after the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision in this case.) At the time of his accident, Bailey 
was traveling on the only public road leading to the mine where 
he worked. Although the road was paved to the mine, it was 
gravel thereafter. While rounding a curve, Bailey lost control 
of his vehicle and was killed. The Industrial Commission held 
that the curve in the road constituted a special hazard. This 
Court reversed finding no evidence that the curve was a hazard 
or that the curve caused the accident. 
In reversing, this Court specified a four part test for 
application of the special hazards exception: 
1. The close association of the access way to 
the employer's premises, usually meaning that is must 
be the only route to the work place." (Emphasis 
added). 
2. A special hazard; 
3. Exposure to the special hazard because of 
the route; 
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4. The causal relationship of special hazard to 
the accident. 
709 P.2d at 1166. 
The facts in Posso's case fall woefully short of this test. 
POINT I 
SINCE POSSE WAS TRAVELING ON HIS NORMAL 
ROUTE, RATHER THAN ON THE ONLY ROUTE, THERE 
IS NO CLOSE ASSOCIATION. 
Posso had three routes to work. Other employees living in 
different areas also had alternative routes. Thus, it was not 
the only route. This alone disqualifies Posso under the close 
association test. 
The Administrative Law Judge and Commission did not even 
properly apply the close association test. Instead, they found 
that the normal route (rather than only route) was a sufficient 
standard. In affirming her, the Commission observed with 
approval: 
The Administrative Law Judge did not accept the more 
restrictive interpretation of the first prong as 
argued by Defendants (to the effect that the road had 
to be the only route, and that the normal route was 
insufficient.) (Emphasis by the Industrial Commis-
sion.) (R. 155) 
This supplants the test explained in Bailey with a normal route 
standard. Since everyone has a normal route to work, the 
Commission's approach would cover anyone traveling their normal 
route to work. This causes the special hazard exception to 
obliterate the rule that travel to and from work is not in the 
course or scope of employment. 
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POINT II 
THE PROXIMITY OF THE BRUSH-WELLMAN ROAD TO 
THE IPP PLANT WITHOUT ANY IDENTIFICATION OF 
THE ROAD WITH THE WORK PLACE PRECLUDES A 
FINDING OF CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE WORK 
PLACE. 
Another reason exists why Posso fails the close association 
test. Close association requires more than proximity. In many 
urban areas, most suburban areas and nearly all rural areas, 
the choice of the route to the work place becomes more and more 
limited as one approaches the work place. Eventually, only one 
public road becomes available. It may be the distance of one 
block or several miles. If close association simply means 
commencement along the final public road necessary to reach the 
place of employment, an enormous inequity arises. Those 
working in suburban and rural areas can be covered for "heavy 
traffic," while urban employees, who encounter much heavier 
traffic than rural employees, are not. In fairness, close 
association requires proximity together with a close associa-
tion of the route to the work place. 
The three Utah cases applying the close association test 
are Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161, 
207 P. 148 (1922), Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 555 (1926), and Park Utah Consoli-
dated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P.2d 
314 (1943). Only Cudahy Packing involved a public road. All 
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three rely on more than proximity. In Cudahy Packing, the 
accident occurred 100 feet from the employer's premises. This 
court found a close association based on the proximity of the 
public road together with the fact that the sole purpose of the 
road was to service the employer, thus identifying the road 
with the work place. 207 P.2d at 149, 150. In Bountiful 
Brick, the employee crawled through a fence along the railroad 
track and was struck by a train 30 feet from the employer's 
premises. This court found a close association based on the 
proximity of the railroad track to the plant with the absolute 
requirement of crossing the railroad track, thus identifying 
the railroad track with the work place. And in Park Utah, the 
employee slipped on ice two paces beyond the employers premises 
on a pathway to the road. This court found a close association 
based on the proximity of the pathway with its sole purpose 
being to serve employees, thus identifying it with the work 
place. 
Here, the road is in proximity to the IPP Plant. However, 
unlike Cudahy Packing, Bountiful Brick, and Park Utah, the 
Brush-Wellman road is not identified with the work place. It 
existed before the plant was built. It services many other 
areas. It will continue to exist if the plant shuts down. 
Without identification of the Brush-Wellman road with the work 
place, a close association does not exist. 
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POINT III 
NO SPECIAL HAZARD EXISTED. 
A. Since The Evidence Presented Showed Light Traffic And 
No Evidence Was Presented To Show General Traffic 
Patterns As Compared To A Norm, A Finding Of Heavy 
Traffic Is Without Support. 
With the construction of the IPP Plant, traffic obviously 
increased on not only the Brush-Wellman Road, but also 
Highway 6, the gravel roads from Delta and the roads from Utah 
County. However, increased traffic does not necessarily mean 
heavy traffic. The only evidence of actual traffic conditions 
was Posso's testimony that traffic was "light." (R. 31) He 
only recalled two other cars on the road--the Blazer next to 
him and the Plymouth more than 150 yards ahead. (R 31, 32) 
Certainly, this does not evidence heavy traffic. The 
Industrial Commission seemed to find heavy traffic from the 
paving of the shoulders for turning lanes. (R. 154) Although 
this does suggest increased traffic during shift changes, it 
does not establish heavy traffic. Ironically, the paving of 
the shoulders suggests a decrease in any congestion, quite the 
contrary of heavy traffic. 
Conspicuously absent in the record is any evidence of 
general traffic conditions. No evidence was presented on 
actual traffic patterns along the Brush-Wellman Road. Nor was 
any evidence presented on traffic patterns on similarly 
-10-
constructed roads in the state. Since "heavy traffic" requires 
comparison with a norm, such evidence was necessary to support 
a finding of heavy traffic. Having no such evidence, the 
finding of heavy traffic was unjustified. 
B. Assuming There Was Heavy Traffic, No Evidence Suggests 
That It Was Hazardous. 
Assuming that traffic during shift changes was heavy, it 
does not necessarily follow that it was hazardous. In Bailey, 
the Industrial Commission found the curve in the road to be 
"peculiar and abnormal." 709 P.2d at 1167. Yet this Court 
properly observed that nothing in the record showed the curve 
to be dangerous. The same may be said here. No evidence was 
presented to show that the increased traffic was dangerous. In 
fact, the only record of any accident is Posso's. Even then, 
there were only three cars on the road. The evidence cannot 
support a conclusion that a hazard existed. 
POINT IV 
THE ALLEGED SPECIAL HAZARD DID NOT CAUSE THE 
ACCIDENT. 
The last requirement of the special hazard exception 
discussed in Bailey requires a causal connection between the 
special hazard and the accident. Neither the Administrative 
Law Judge nor the Commission explained how the alleged heavy 
traffic caused the accident. The evidence repudiates such a 
connection. 
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First, Posso said traffic was "light." Only two other cars 
were observed on the road. (R. 31, 32) Obviously, traffic was 
not heavy and could not have caused the accident,. 
Second, the accident was caused either by the Plymouth 
failing to signal a left-hand turn (R. 32), by Posso's using 
the oncoming lane of traffic to pass a nearly stopped vehicle 
(R. 32), or by a combination of both. Any way it is examined, 
traffic conditions were irrelevant. There is no causal connec-
tion between the accident and the alleged special exception. 
CONCLUSION 
Although not directly a party to this action, the Inter-
mountain Power Agency has great concern for how the Industrial 
Commission treats vehicle accidents occurring on the Brush-
Wellman Road involving those who work at the IPP Plant. If the 
standard used by the Industrial Commission is upheld, con-
tractors and subcontractors as well as IPA must pay for all 
auto accidents involving employees going and coming to work on 
the Brush-Wellman Road. This would distort the purpose of the 
Worker's Compensation Act and subvert the special hazard rule 
established by this Court. The Industrial Commission's Order 
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should be reversed. It should be determined that Posso was not 
in the course or scope of his employment when, while on his way 
home, he unwisely attempted to pass a stopped vehicle. 
DATED this 22nd day of August, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Henry K. Cha 
Attorneys f 
Power Age 
SCM1323I 
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